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THE WELFARE STATE WITHIN THE MILITARY
Charles Maynard and Ann Blalock
Much has been written concerning the extent to which contemporary industri- -
alized societies meet the accepted criteria of a "welfare state".1 By contrast,
the literature on the welfare aspects of the military as an institution within
societies is comparatively sparse. Yet internally, military establishments often
exhibit many welfare state attributes. Within the military's organizational
territory and authority, members are provided with a wide spectrum of comprehensive
universal entitlements--social, economic, occupational, educational, and medical.
The formal parameters of the U.S. military establishment's welfare entitlements
give the undeniable appearance of a bonafide welfare state whose provision is
significantly more benevolent and equitable than that provided to the nonmilitary.
As with all welfare systems, however, the unique welfare state within the military
has developed more in response to its own perceived organizational needs and re-
quirements than to a rational assessment of the "real" needs of those it serves--
military personnel and their families. 2
In this sense, the military welfare state reflects the organizational im-
peratives, constraints, and ambiguities common to diverse forms of welfare pro-
vision, which are inevitably generated by the contradiction between the genuine
social welfare needs of recipients and the survival requirements of the provider.
Therefore, an analysis of military social welfare in the context of the military
environment should provide insights not only into the nature of social provision
in the military, but into welfare structures generally. This brief investigation
may also illuminate an aspect of the welfare/warfare problem only infrequently
addressed.
The military welfare state, however, is an unusual case, because of the nature
of the military establishment's primary manifest function in the society, and
therefore of its organizational goals. The military is mandated to provide an
adequate and acceptable response to the society's definition of what constitutes
major threats to its security in the external environment. Even more narrowly,
its responsibility is to afford protection in an international environment which
has historically been characterized by the threat of physical force, as compared
with the dangers inherent in international economic and political competition.
Therefore, the goals of the military establishment are highly specialized:
the development of superior defensive, offensive, and deterrent capability. In
pursuing these goals, the military has been vulnerable to all the organizational
requisites characteristic of social systems generally, as well as to their
special elaboration in large scale bureaucratic systems. Most significant among
them are the maintenance of internal order and morale, and the securing of the
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organization's safety in the external environment--in this case, the civilian
sector.3 The way in which these requisites are viewed by those in authority de-
termine the military's needs and requirements. Social welfare entitlements to
individuals and families are considered part of such requirements. Factors such
as the increasing demands of members' changing societal conditions, alterations in
the bureaucratic structure, changing definitions of national security, and techno-
logical breakthroughs, have modified the definition of survival imperatives in the
direction of expanding the military welfare state.
Our thesis is that this welfare state is not in actual practice what it pur-
ports to be. There are serious inequities and constrictions which have eroded
military social provision, largely because the organizational goals which signi-
ficantly shape this system are clearly servants first of warfare, and only second-
arily of real welfare.
The General Dimensions of the Military Welfare State
Although most of the data on military social services are primarily descriptive
of the U.S. Army, formalized social provision to all branches of the armed services
has comprehensive features. Walter Friedlander's article describes the many univer-
sal entitlements which apply both during and beyond the period of service, involving
literally cradle to grave benefits.4  These are: income maintenance, job provision,
housing provision, recreational benefits (both social and rehabilitative), medical-
dental care (for service personnel and their families), social work services for
individuals and families, psychiatric diagnosis and treatment, on-the-job training,
vocational training, readjustment allowances for veterans formerly employed or self-
employed, educational and training subsidies (GI Bill) and education for dependents
overseas, disability benefits (economic compensation, medical care, pensions, sub-
sistence allowances, special aid for the blind, deaf, and amputees, after-care in
halfway houses, nursing homes, and outpatient clinics), business and home loans,
life insurance, retirement pay, death pensions, educational benefits for veterans'
survivors, and burial services for indigent veterans. These welfare benefits and
services, representing an enormous national expenditure, are theoretically pro-
vided to all members of the military for whom they are ;elevant, within the re-
strictions of the hierarchical military ranking system.
In this sense, the welfare state within the military establishment is an
intriguing paradox. It seems more beneficent at all levels than its civilian
parallel, while functioning within a caste-like stratification system which is
structurally much less flexible and socially mobile than its nurturing society.
It is at the same time more collectively equitable and more individually constrain-
ing. In the non-military sector, governmental responsibility has traditionally
involved "residual" definitions of welfare, in contrast to the military application
of "institutional" definitions. The former view suggests that "social welfare
institutions should come into play only when the normal structures of supply, the
family, and the market break down," whereas the latter holds that social services
are "normal, first line functions of a modern industrial society." 6 Despite the
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broader definition characteristic of the military, welfare is accompanied by im-
mense physical jeopardy in wartime, and considerably more in peacetime than in most
parts of civilian society. And it is an interesting case of uneven formal govern-
mental definitions of human needs within different sectors of the society.
The formal distinction between residual and institutional definitions, however,
is moot. The existence of the military welfare state is indirectly dependent on an
expropriation from the civilian welfare system, in the sense that national priori-
ties have in recent history essentially involved a transfer of scarce goods from
domestic programs to defense. It is important to note that certain important cate-
gories of needs created but unmet by the military also inevitably deplete the re-
sources of civilian social and health services.
Within this context, our purpose is to concentrate on two general categories
of entitlements within the military welfare state: occupational benefits and income
maintenance; and social services to individuals and families. In each case, it will
be our objective to examine some of the explicit purposes and implicit effects of
military social provision.
The Military Welfare State: Occupational Benefits and Income Maintenance
Government job creation and guaranteed annual income have been goals of
liberal reformers in responding to the problems of stimulating the economy, re-
ducing inflation, lowering unemployment, and dealing with poverty. However, the
military is rarely thought of as an authentic government job or income maintenance
system. For many, it has been the employer of last resort, but for low-income
minorities it has often been viewed as the employer of maximum opportunity.7 And
for a significant number it has provided civilian jobs directly underwritten by the
military budget. 8 There is no question but what the military subsidizes a sub-
stantial portion of the potentially unemployed, and provides unskilled, semi-
skilled, technical, supervisory, and managerial jobs for many members of the
society. Furthermore, income and fringe benefits are competitive with the demands
of organized labor in the private civilian sector.9 Job security is assured with-
in a different set of limits from the civilian employment system, but the limits
are similarly dictated by what kind of behaviors are considered destructive of the
goals of the employer. The military formally offers more extensive occupational
benefits than many civilian employers, in terms of job training, vocational train-
ing, special educational programs, and after-service educational and training
grants for skill upgrading. Retirement benefits allow the serviceperson the
possibility of civilian employment in middle age, supplemented by a guaranteed
income (even though highly related in amount to the military ranking system).
Early retirement, combined with reserve status, would seem to provide both more
economic and occupational flexibility in one's lifetime than the civilian labor
market.
The important question is whether the military is providing, in actuality,
occupational and economic welfare. The following selected examples reveal
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discrepancies and inequities in these entitlements within the military welfare
state.
Minority and Low-income Military Personnel
In the early years of the Vietnam War, black leaders actively encouraged re-
cruitment from the ghetto into the armed services, in the interest of increased
occupational and economic mobility in the society. This was premised on findings
which indicated that WWII veterans were enjoying economic superiority in civilian
career competition vis-a-vis their nonveteran cohort.10 It was also recognized
that racial integration in the U.S. military had in some ways progressed further
than the parallel process in civilian life, both chronologically and in degree.7
7
Badillo and Curry explain this phenomenon in terms of the Armed Forces' reliance
on "meritocratic" criteria in the assignment process, which reflected "thy pre-
occupation of military elites with rational and bureaucratic efficiency." '2
However, though these criteria were equitable, many of the occupational and income
outcomes for ethnic minorities within the military were not.
By the late 1960s nearly 20% of Vietnam combat units were black. More sig-
nificantly, blacks and other minorities, and low income whites, were markedly
over-represented in combat casualty rates.13 Differential casualty figures were
reinforced by the disprQ ortionately high battle death rates for volunteers as
compared with draftees.R That the major variable was socioeconomic status more
than ethnic identity was supported by several studies which concluded that the
assignment process was highly contingent on socioeconomic background and tended to
channel individuals from lower-class backgrounds into positions more susceptible
to combat casualties.
15
However, the same factors that diminished the importance of race as a criterion
for decisions about assignment, worked to increase the significance of those attri-
butes of the socialization process which correlated (economically and educationally)
with ethnic status. The military's use of essentially culturally-biased achieve-
ment variables to assess potential competency, which employed the occupational,
educational, and income levels of parents as indicators, was discriminatory in out-
come. Ethnic minorities and low income whites have been most likely to score low
on all three. There is generally an unbalanced competition between the skilled
and unskilled for noncombatant tasks, and this is exaggerated in so far as those
military specialities which involve the greatest exposure to danger are also those
requiring the lowest level of preservice training and ability. Through the occu-
pational stratification of personnel, these factors have resulted in inequities
in the application of the military welfare state's formalized occupational en-
titlements. The stratification process has tended to reward those who have been
advantaged in civilian society, and has resulted in disproportionate injury and
loss of life for certain groups of personnel in wartime.
Upward mobility in the civilian occupational structure by way of the military
not only depends on the acquisition of increased job skills, to which combat skills
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have traditionally provided little or no contribution, but also on leadership
opportunities not equally available in the civilian labor market. The more de-
sirable leadership positions have been difficult for minorities and low-income
personnel to obtain. The proportion of black officers, for example, remained
statically low even after civil rights gains became evident in the civilian occupa-
tional structure. As late as 1974, although 14.4% of the armed forces were blacks,
only 3% of blacks were officers. 16
Even the range of noncombat skills acquired in the armed services have had
little transfer value (real marketability) in the civilian labor market, and for
the previously disadvantaged this has been especially so. 17 Although successful
re-entry to the civilian manpower system from the military has been complex to
analyze and interpret, it is significant that in 1972 the average unemployment rate
for Vietnam-era veterans was 6.7%, while the total average rate for men 16 and over
was 4.9%; and still in 1974 it was 11.3% for Vietnam-era veterans and 9.1% for the
total male civilian labor force. The average unemployment rate for minority and low
income veterans in each case was significantly higher. 18
The incomes of ex-military personnel reflect the same discrepancy. A study
analyzing a large random sample of veterans and nonveterans found that by 1970
there was a persistent differential in earnings between Vietnam-era veterans and
non-veterans, a differential which increased with the size of the income category.
For example, though 26% of nonveterans were earning at least $10,000 only 14% of
veterans were doing so, and while 10% of nonveterans were earning at least $13,000,
only 4% of veterans were doing so. Only 6% of nonwhite veterans were earning at
least $10,000 and only 1.9% were earning at least $13,000.19 Although it is plaus-
ible that the differences in incomes reflected the differential return of veterans
to the educational system--i.e. those not returning to college, graduate school, or
training programs having less ability to earn--this is not an adequate explanation.
The military welfare state's theory of educational readjustment has had a
strong relationship to the institutional commitment to occupational and income main-
tenance. The purpose of the GI Bill was explicitly to subsidize the education of
the veteran to compensate him for time lost during military service. The assumption
was that education was clearly related to occupational mobility and increased in-
come. However, veterans' educational benefits for Vietnam-era veterans have till
very recently been considerably less in absolute value than those for WWII veterans.
Only 20% of these veterans (compared with 50% after WWII) were using the GI Bill in
1969. Thus those who needed the entitlement most--minority and low income veterans--
were effectively prevented from using it. As the political struggle to increase
these benefits began to have an impact, the utilization rate had increased to 46%
by 1973, still with a lower rate for disadvantaged veterans. The consistent op-
position of the Veterans Administration to increasing educational benefits, and
providing veterans services on campuses, illustrates the subservience of the
military welfare state to the organizational priorities of the larger military
establishment.
A huge, heavily financed bureaucracy, whose budget is one of the largest of
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any federal agency, the VA is officially committed to the delivery of the military
welfare state's social benefits to a substantial segment of the ex-military popula-
tion, yet its lack of responsiveness to Vietnam-era veterans--in particular minori-
ties--indicates the relative unimportance of service delivery once personnel are no
longer necessary to the functioning of the military. This disinterest of the VA in
the special educational readjustment problems on campuses basically hostile to war
participants, and non-nurturing toward the coping problems of minority veterans
little prepared for the culture shock of movement into the higher educational sys-
tem, has increased the problems of this group of GI Bill users. 20
Therefore, although income and occupational maintenance benefits appear nomi-
nally superior to those of civilian society, and even extend beyond the time of
service, for minority and low income military personnel there are obvious contra-
dictions in their application. Certain efforts have been made to redress this
inequity. Project Transition, a six-month predischarge training program initiated
in 1967 to ease re-entry, though an excellent concept, failed to provide the serv-
ices promised. The Department of Labor's manpower training programs, which utilized
veterans' preference and minority preference guidelines, tended to involve veterans
in dead-end low-skilled jobs. State employment systems yielded little help for the
sizeable number of combat veterans with few technical skills, those who had been in
a holding operation in low-skilled military jobs, and for disabled veterans. The
National Alliance of Businessmen's job program, specifically for veterans, provided
longer-term jobs with greater opportunities for upgrading, but placed only a small
proportion of those veterans unemployed.21
The major difficulty could not easily be resolved: the specialized occupation-
al needs of the military are responsive first to running an effective war machine,
not to enhancing industrial growth or achieving full employment in the civilian
sector. Though supporting defense-related industrial growth is of vital concern to
the military, and a significant portion of the gross national product is consumed
by the military establishment, industrialization concerns and labor market condi-
tions are not considered within the military's area of responsibility. Consequently,
easing the transfer of ex-military personnel to civilian industry, or increasing the
utility of their skills to civilian industry and business is not an instrumental
goal.
Military Retirees and Civilian Occupational Re-entry
Though a universal entitlement, the opportunity for occupational retirement
considerably earlier than in civilian life is in actuality a meaningless benefit
for non-career personnel, a sizeable group in wartime. For career military, however,
it theoretically allows a shift to the civilian labor market cushioned by the
military retirement pay subsidy. As "real" welfare, it is a mixed blessing. Even
when the individual's military-acquired skills are considered useful by businesses
and industries, these personnel have been in strong competition with better es-
tablished, more organizationally senior, and more union-integrated rivals for
scarce jobs. Bureaucratic management styles and procedures differ, and new
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behavioral expectations are hard to identify and learn. Dumas emphasizes the
difficulties in the conversion of technical scientific and engineering skills for
peacetime industrial use.2 2 In addition, the very protectiveness of the military
welfare state has increased the vulnerability of retirees to culture shock in
re-entry to civilian life.
Also, military retirement typically occurs at a stage of the family life cycle
which demands complex adjustments for multiple family members. No adequate prepara-
tion is provided systematically within the military for confronting the new re-
socialization process which is required by this group. The lack of response by the
military to what becomes of personnel after retirement is somewhat similar to the
civilian sector, but the latter occurs to the retiree at a much later chronological
age and stage of the family life cycle, and therefore is within a very different
cultural context.
Many retirees--both officers and enlisted men--have experienced periods of
unemployment and have often needed to take jobs which were not equivalent to the
skill level and prestige of their former military positions. Many have returned to
academic programs for retraining in fields in which they may not have extensive
prior knowledge or experience, and in which they are in competition with much
younger students with more current backgrounds. These transition experiences have
been genuine life crises for many ex-military personnel and their families.
The paternalism inherent in the military welfare system is evident in the
sense of isolation from the rest of the society felt by many of these newly-
returned retirees. The residues of public anti-military attitudes complicate this
sense of separation. As a group, these personnel and their families have unmet
needs which eventually involve the use of civilian welfare resources and which con-
stitute a hidden defense-related cost which effectively reduces the national social
services allocation to other groups of recipients.
On the other hand, for those retirees at the top of the military hierarchy,
the retirement subsidy represents a sizeable income. Moreover, the prestige of
their former positions has tended to be retained in civilian life. Since contacts
made while in the military, with government and corporation bureaucracies, have been
substantial--and since their specializations have been more translatable and more
in demand--these personnel have not only enjoyed disproportionate benefits within
the military welfare state, but have in many instances displaced civilian personnel
from important positions.
Women in the Military, and Occupational Entitlements
Women have constituted less than the 2% quota for female military personnel
since it was authorized at the close of World War II, and have always been a volun-
teer army. However, it should be mentioned that women have to a significant extent
made the mounting of modern mass-mobilization wars possible through occupying the
work force positions of men absorbed into the military, positions which were
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critical to the production of weapons and war supplies and to domestic survival.
By 1975, with the gradual shift to an explicitly all-volunteer force, women
constityted 4.5% of all military personnel on active duty, including academic
cadets. zJ Historically, women in the military have been excluded from direct combat
roles and significant administrative jobs, and have typically been relegated to
nursing, and routine supervisory and clerical jobs. They have experienced much
stronger occupational segregation than in the civilian labor market. As Goldman
comments, "the military is the epitome of a male-dominated establishment." 24
Charles Moskos terms it "a vestige of male sanctity."2 5
Nevertheless, the military made strong promises to upgrade and increase female
career options in the 70s--that Is, to improve the occupational benefits of the
military welfare state where women were concerned. This represented more than an
appreciation of the changing role of women in civilian society. It reflected,
Goldman says, a new perception of women personnel as a necessary technical labor
resource.26  It also, she contends, symbolized an appreciation of the necessity of
broadening sex roles because of the increased emphasis on administration, logistics,
communication, and deterrence. Organizational, professional, and recruitment
changes were needed by the military.
But there has been little real movement on the part of the military to system-
atically incorporate women into military operations and other key military assign-
ments. The military still does not perceive as an organizational imperative the
adoption of a value system which would permit substantial movement toward real
occupational equality for women personnel. Goldman comments that the context of
military practices, and the nature of the military system, "presents [for women]
a case of the search for equality without the opportunity of similarity of speciali-
zation or task with their male counterparts."27
Women are therefore likely to continue to experience significant organizational
resistances and role strains. Goldman claims these cross pressures mirror many
forces: formal allocation limits on the overall number of women in the armed
forces, the sex typing of professional and occupational roles, civil service re-
quirements which emphasize equity-producing promotion criteria, powerful elaborate
standards for promotion which tend to penalize the most gifted and creative of both
sexes, the existence of sex-segregated occupational associations within the military,
the marginal access of women officers to military social life, the trend toward
managerial authority side by side with the crisis-prone organizational reality which
centralizes control and hampers the extension of women into authority positions, the
increasing emphasis on specialization but the persistence of rewards for being a
generalist, and the ranking system which tends to separate the position from the
person. The net outcome for women is the disparate promotion of women officers.
Apart from this inequity in the application of occupational and income benefits,
women are likely also to continue to have difficulty with what Goldman terms the
"sexual symbolism" which permeates the military because of the communal nature of
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the military environment, a setting in which work and residential roles overlap.
Such symbolism has an obvious impact on occupational life. In this respect also,
job provision and income maintenance have fallen short of real welfare. And Goldman
concludes that women are destined to continue to have problems in an institution
whose major function is the management of violence.
The military provides jobs and income maintenance for personnel in order to
produce an efficient, effective deterrent and offensive capability in the interest
of national security. Adequate occupational and income maintenance, tied to other
benefits which would be very costly to individuals outside the military, provides
a necessary incentive to perform the tasks required by the military organization,
to reduce potential unrest within that system, and to compensate for the dangers
in military service and for the high level of regulation of the behavior, attitudes,
and life styles of military personnel. Therefore, military welfare is at once
protective and controlling. And within these occupational and economic entitle-
ments there are significant inequities in pay, occupational status, the sophistica-
tion of tasks, the technological level of skills, and the rewards and risks involved
in membership in the military welfare state.
Military Social Services to Individuals
The United Nation's definition of social services as "organizational activities
whose purpose is to further a mutual adjustment of individuals and their social
environment" has special meaning within the military establishment.28 That social
environment is quite circumscribed, not only in wartime but in peacetime, and the
mutual adjustment process is skewed: individual personnel and military families
are required to do the major part of the accommodation. To illustrate this latent
aspect of social service provision, we will narrow our analysis to psychiatric and
social work services to individuals and families, and to particular examples within
these.
Mental Health Services During and Following War
Symptoms of maladjustment to military life represent a major organizational
problem for the military both in peacetime and most critically in combat situations
during war, just as the incidence of mental illness constitutes a serious social
problem for civilian society. Both sectors of the society associate considerable
costs with inadequate individual adjustment, both in organizational efficiency and
in the capacity to implement primary goals. However, different limits of tolerance
and distinctive definitions of deviant behavior have been characteristic of the
more restrictive and demanding military environment. Individual adjustment has
been viewed within "the institutional and situational demands of [military] duty."
29
The main indices of successful adaptation have been an absence of disciplinary
problems in peacetime, and a low breakdown rate in war, rather than more objective
measures of psychological health. Therefore, the prediction and prevention of this
form of maladjustment gradually became the major function of military psychiatry.
This is not inconsistent with the military's continued acknowledgement of the impact
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of combat stress on the fighting capability of personnel.
The history of professional services to individuals has therefore responded to
the military's changing perceptions of its needs in producing an effective fighting
force. The origin of professional counseling was in 1l8 when the Red Cross provided
social workers to aid in the diagnosis, treatment, and after care of soldiers with
"functional neuroses.",30 Early in World War II, the emphasis was on psychiatric
screening of draftees and enlistees to determine unfitness for combat prior to
absorption into the military, the purpose being to select only those capable of
high performance within current military requirements.31 As the war increasingly
demanded greater militarization of the population, and the loss of potential
personnel through screening was sizeable, a shift occurred in the direction of
retaining within the military not only those defined as most able but also those
with psychiatric disorders who were "capable of performance at any reasonable
level.",
To sustain this broader definition of military capability during heavy mobili-
zation, psychiatric and social work services turned toward a 'social psychiatric'
concept of combat disorders "involving mental hygiene services, consultation to
command, and preventive psyciatry."33 The nature of prevention and treatment be-
came tied to the proper use of combat personnel by the command structure. Consid-
ered most important in prevention were the duration of exposure to a given combat
situation, the nature of the prior training, and the length of the tour of combat
duty. 4 These were seen as variables manipulatable by command personnel in re-
ducing the incidence of combat-related mental disorders. The main elements of the
treatment approach became immediacy--the necessity of implementing treatment as
early and as close to the lines as possible; expectation--treatment carried out
with the anticipation that the soldier would return to combat; simplicity--
treatment focused on the combat circumstances producing the condition rather than
on predisposing factors in the past; and centrality--the availability of a psychiat-
ric staff where psychological casualties were evacuated.35 These concepts were used
to some extent in WW II, but largely due to the different nature of the wars, they
were the exclusive guiding principles in Korea and Vietnam. The central purpose
was to maintain all personnel in a combat-ready frame of mind.
This reshaping of military psychiatry around changing organizational impera-
tives produced a substantial expansion in the military welfare state through new
interventions. Psychotropic drug medication was only one example. The extension
of social services was credited by many with the significantly lower breakdown
rate reported in the Vietnam War.6 However, this apparent increased responsive-
ness to the coping problems of individual military personnel, particularly in
combat, must be examined in a larger context.
Breakdown rates have always suffered from diverse definition and interpreta-
tion, and considerable measurement error. They reveal, usually to an unknown
extent, as Borus suggests, the soldier's "past history of coping, the flexibility
and variety of the coping repertoire he has established in adjusting to past
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transitions [crises]. '"37 Borus views coping within a remarkably military-type
model as "a process of struggle, as in warfare, when the individual must mobilize
his resources and allocate them to offensive, defensive, and systems-management
operations to ameliorate significant stress."
What is also revealed in breakdown rates, however, is the relative successful-
ness of military socialization. Basic combat training, for example, is designed to
place the soldier under selected physical and psychological stress, and strongly
emphasizes the acceptability of overt expressions of hostility and violence under
combat circumstances. Many of the tenets of Maslowian "self-actualization" are
deliberately eroded.3 8 Conformance to military requirements takes precedence over
the development of personal values independent of the organization. Personal paci-
fist tendencies and attitudes supporting cultural relativism, for example, are nega-
tively sanctioned. The degree of psychological stress experienced by different
personnel is therefore related not only to combat conditions per se, but to the
whole milieu in which both the majority of one's peers and the helping professionals
have been socialized to support the "healthiness" of certain personal attributes
over others.
In addition, other factors were felt to have made a strong contribution to the
low breakdown rate: the degree of cohesiveness felt by the combat group and its
sense of identity as a unit, the way in which the unit perceived the adequacy of
its leadership, the episodic nature of the fighting, the absence of psychological
rewards for evacuation to rear areas, the widespread use of drugs, and perhaps most
significantly the rotation system. 39 Some quarreled with these interpretations.
Savage and Gabriel, for instance, proposed that cohesion, discipline and profession-
al leadership in Vietnam exhibited several major indicators of disintegration: the
replacement of traditional officer stereotypes with managerial noncombat role images,
the troubling intermingling of combat and noncombat personnel, and the destruction
of primary military groups due to the rotation system.40 But differing explanations
of the low breakdown rate ignore a more basic question: to what extent did the
social services within the military welfare state, which contributed to reducing
mental breakdown, actually increase the mental health of members of the military in
wartime?
It is deceptive to view the psychological health of combat personnel in any
other context than an environment which generates far greater fears, anxiety, anJ
guilt--and much more psychological brutalization--than most civilian life situa-
tions. Though a minority of personnel gain self-identity and personal integration
through combat roles, this form of wholeness has questionable connotations. Some
of the behavior expected of personnel by the military in wartime is clearly illness-
producing, by civilian psychiatric standards. And among military personnel these
expectations are differentially illness-producing, inasmuch as a higher proportion
of low income and ethnic minorities experience combat. Therefore a reduction in
certain symptoms of clinical illness under severe stress must be analyzed in terms
of the life quality of military personnel.
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It is important in this respect to discuss briefly the unexpected rate of
"civilian readjustment breakdown" which occurred among a significant number of
Vietnam veterans.4 1 The complicated matrix of delayed symptoms was titled "the
post-Vietnam syndrome" by civilian psychiatrists. Shatan and Lifton identified
its basic themes as a strong tendency to experience episodes of terror and dis-
orientation, threat-avoiding mechanisms appropriate to combat carried over to
civilian relationships, a distrust of establishment pyschiatric and social work
services, guilt and undischarged grief over those killed and injured, and a per-
vasive feeling of victimization b military and government agencies and by hostile
public attitudes toward the war.4z The military took little interest in this phe-
nomenon, treating these problems as "non-service-connected disabilities," thus
making services within the military system and the Veteran's Administration un-
available to this group. The civilian welfare system was poorly prepared to treat
men with unique post-combat and civilian transition problems, and coped deficiently
with this group of clients. Meanwhile the difficulties involved in the veteran's
occupational and educational integration increased the severity of the
syndrome. The military welfare state was far more capable, potentially, of
developing a meaningful pre-discharge and post-discharge counseling program around
this problem. But the military bureaucracy, which needed to resocialize civilians
to lower their normal control over violent impulses in combat, did not feel an
equally strong obligation to deal with the inevitable personal consequences of such
training and experience. In returning to a society which had been undergoing con-
siderable social change in the direction of increasing alienation toward such per-
sonal warfare credentials, veterans found that both the military and civilian welfare
systems treated readjustment problems with benign neglect.
Drug Abuse Services
The use of drugs during the Vietnam War posed a sufficient threat to combat
effectiveness and the maintenance of morale and order in the armed forces to stimu-
late the introduction of new preventive and rehabilitative services. Though Jones
and Johnson claim that "drug abuse became an evacuation syndrome paralleling in
scale the loss of manpower due to 'war neurosis' in the early stages of World War
II," others hypothesized that there was a marked relationship between the low break-
down rate and the enhancement of coping abilities through non-addictive drug use,
particularly marijuana. 43
Bourne discussed the physiological effects of drugs in alleviating stress
symptoms.44 Bey and Zecchinelli took the position that marijuana had indeed served
as a coping device in Vietnam.45 Roffman suggested that "it is within the realm of
possibility.. .that moderate marijuana use for some soldiers--perhaps for most
soldiers (in Vietnam]--reduces the likelihood of mental illness [and] personality
disorganization." 6 He proposed that marijuana use may have assisted some service-
men with "healthy efforts at coping with a hostile environment." Saunders felt
illicit drug use, rather than arising from character disorders, was for some a
rational means of dealing with military life in Vietnam.47
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The military's labeling of the level of drug use as seriously disruptive, and
its institutionalization of treatment services, was therefore largely a reactive
response to fears of reduced combat performance, rather than an interest in deter-
mining the extent of the problem or its consequences for individuals. That this
was the case seems borne out by the paucity of military research on drug use, and
the secrecy with which Defense Department data were handled. Consequently much of
the research has been retrospective, methodologically poor, and the results contra-
dictory. The better data suggest that drug use was quite extensive, though far less
than some reports had indicated. And it was estimated that only approximately five
percent of servicemen in Vietnam were physically addicted.48
The data unequivocally suggest that the majority of drug users were first intro-
duced to drugs in Vietnam. Marijuana use was most extensive, the higher incidence
rates being among younger servicemen, those of lower rank, single persons, personnel
with urban backgrounds, and ethnic minorities. There was higher use in the field
than in base camp areas, and somewhat more use in combat areas than rear areas.
Serious adverse reactions attributed to marijuana use occurred in only a very small
proportion of chronic heavy users. There was a surprisingly high rate of remission
of drug use upon return to civilian life.
A close relationship existed, then, between the conditions of war and the
fluorescence of a social problem, particularly in a war where drugs were readily
available and where certain personnel at relatively high levels of the military
hierarchy were actually involved in illegal purchase and distribution. Those in
authority in the military, however, viewed the problem mainly in terms of social
control, and largely for this reason drug treatment services were generally in-
appropriate and ineffective. More seriously, the application and utilization of
these benefits were uneven, and the consequences for individuals seeking or assigned
to them revealed the ambivalence with which the military power structure defined the
role abuse played in strengthening or weakening combat units.
Chemical dependency was responded to within changing and arbitrary sets of
criteria. The identification of those "needing" services was often dependent on
the command personnel's perception of the value of a particular unit in meeting
immediate troop requirements in combat, irrespective of the level of drug abuse
within it. If behavior within a unit appeared to involve disciplinary problems,
and the unit was not essential to military operations, individuals were often more
likely to be channeled to services. This sorting of drug abusers into social
services frequently resulted in less-than-honorable discharges. Because the extent
of the abuse reported within units varied considerably among commanding officers,
discharges were sometimes based on idiosyncratic evaluations of the amount and
chronicity of drug use.
Even under the drug abuse amnesty program, publicized by the military as an
important additional social service, many self-confessed addicted personnel were
stigmatized with such discharges. The special treatment programs under the amnesty
program were, in actual practice, not made available to many who needed them. The
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data on discharges suggested that the disproportionate number of minority veterans
who received less-than-honorable discharges based on drug abuse, was in all proba-
bility related to the high proportion of black personnel in combat units. The dis-
charge review process, formally available for reinstating veterans benefits, was
implemented successfully in less than 1% of the cases where review was requested,
and applications piled up for months and sometimes years prior to a hearing.49
As a result, insurmountable difficulties were created for many veterans in
gaining civilian employers' trust and in dealing with the double-bind in civilian
society: labeling both as a participant in an unpopular war, and as a potentially
problematic reject from military service. The evidence strongly supported the claim
that some drug-connected less-than-honorable discharges were related more to black
militancy than to chronic drug abuse. Because the overwhelming majority of dis-
charges were administrative rather than given through the court martial procedure,
only minimum due process protection was available. In addition, "general" dis-
charges, which fell within the honorable category and therefore did not involve a
loss of benefits, nevertheless officially stigmatized the returning veteran in
civilian society, and reduced his employability. The defining of the individual as
"unsuitable" for military performance had broad connotations to civilian employers,
far beyond the ability to adjust to military combat. Furthermore, those veterans
re-entering civilian life with a genuine drug abuse or alcoholism problem, developed
in Vietnam, were denied by their discharges the treatment specifically developed to
respond to their needs. Moreover, they were deprived of the educational and train-
ing benefits which could have provided healthy support for re-entry.
Taussig suggests five basic criteria for evaluating the entitlements of welfare
systems: the adequacy of benefits, cost-effectiveness, horizontal equity, preserva-
tion of incentives, and absence of stigma. 50 Drug abuse entitlements proved to be
inadequate, relatively ineffective, inequitable, alienating, and stigmatizing. This
was so mainly because they were provided within the organizational limits of the
military environment and were not the servant of real welfare.
Social Services in Peacetime
In peacetime, and away from combat zones in wartime, the pattern of utilization
of psychiatric and social work services within the military also discloses inequi-
ties in the military welfare state, which correlate with the structural character-
istics of the military establishment. For example, differential "acceptability" has
been traditionally attached to different types of individual problems. In practice
this has meant that those with drug and alcohol problems have had the least access
to social services, those with medical problems the highest, personal problems have
fallen in between, and problem involving protest behavior have been completely ex-
cluded from the welfare state. 1 The discrepancies in the value judgements associ-
ated with different clusters of behavioral "symptoms" have been discriminatory in
outcome, favoring those traits which are in conformance with desirable organiza-
tional outcomes. As mentioned previously, the withdrawal of certain social service
entitlements are likewise linked with "unacceptable behavior" by these standards.
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The decision not to make full use of needed entitlements is also constrained
by the rigid stratification system which helps define the criteria for upward mcbil-
ity. Janowitz has documented the highly competitive promotion path of the career
officer, emphasizing the intensity of that competition particularly at the mid-level
and higher level ranks. He points out that serious jeopardy is involved in the pro-
motion board's notice of possible blemishes to the individual's suitability for
shouldering responsibility. 2 One such blemish can be the implication that the
individual has sought or needs to obtain help with personal problems. These prob-
lems, by contrast with physical symptoms, are considered controllable, and control-
lability is related to promotional adequacy in a traditional, male-oriented system.
This pressure effectively limits the use of counseling and treatment benefits by
officers: it is occupationally safer to seek help from non-military personnel or
from military personnel on an unofficial basis. In some cases, this has led to
black market services which benefit only one category of military personnel and
undermine services to others. Because of strict occupational stratification, en-
listed men do not frequenly work through the ranks to officer status, and tend not
to be (by self-selection) as career oriented. Consequently they have not been as
constrained by military norms to avoid the use of these entitlements. Nevertheless,
these values also create strains for enlisted personnel.
More insidious is the tendency of the military to view lack of conformity to
the proper definition of behavior in superior-subordinate relationships, and to the
performance of appropriate combat roles, as an index of military unsuitability. An
example of the command structure's concern about the latter is the existence of the
Air Force Human Reliability Program. This program attempts to identify and remove
individuals considered "unreliable" from critical assignments. Such individuals may
or may not need help, yet the negative consequences of seeking help may inhibit the
individual from securing much needed assistance and support.
Definitions of appropriate sex role behavior also play a part in the access to
and use of psychiatric and social work services. As in civilian life, the presence
of symptoms is much more an acceptable rationale for women seeking help than for
men, as the dependency inherent in asking for help is more consistent with tradi-
tional sex role definitions. However, this inequity is exaggerated in the military
welfare state by the much stronger emphasis on the virility and personal ego
strength of male personnel, which has been a persistent machismo norm within mili-
tary systems long before Sparta. This context also affects the utilization of
services, as they are provided predominantly by male military professionals whose
values tend to be compatible with traditional sex role expectations. The special
strains which women experience in the military are often not recognized as legiti-
mate problems for which healthy coping repertoires are needed, and the emphasis is
placed on the adjustment of the woman to the generally male-dominated requirements
of the organization.
The point we wish to illustrate is that the norms and values of the military
"culture," and the social structure of the military "society," create serious in-
equities in how responsive military social provision has actually been to the needs
of individuals functioning within it and making transitions from it. The purpose
-508-
of military social services is more clearly related to the suitable performance of
military tasks and to internal order--within the primary goal of maintaining an
efficient, effective war machine--than to the usual definitions of mental health and
illness followed in non-military settings.
Social Service Entitlements to Military Families
The armed services have only gradually become a familistic institution, in the
sense of giving attention to the families of military personnel. This change has
been in response to developments in the larger society, among which have been the
general increase in the percentage of persons living in family units and the growth
in medical and contraceptive technology. Trends within the military have also been
operative: a consistently lower divorce rate than in the outer society, and a re-
duction in the average age of active-duty personnel. The particular position of the,
military in an advanced industrialized democracy has meant that career personnel
have increasingly demanded a similar family life style to civilians. 53
However, the main objective of social services to families has been to prevent
family disruption, based on the assumption that the family is a critical support
system for military personnel. This notice of the military function of the family
has in large part been a response to the realities of the civilian divorce and sepa-
ration rates, new sexual values and sex role definitions, and new family configura-
tions. Janowitz has commented that there has been a growing recognition that a
breakdown in family relationships is a threat to military performance, and asserts
that the military has come to believe that "the solution of family problems is
essential for professional solidarity." 54
Until recently the average number of children in military families has steadily
increased. Military families have been characterized by younger wives, younger
children, and fewer wives employed outside the home, than their parallels in non-
military society. This too has increased the demand for additional services and
has supported a modification of the military's view of its priorities. At the same
time there has been less stigma attached to acknowledging family problems, as they
are not interpreted as being as controllable by military personnel as individual
personal problems, chemical dependency, or incorrigibility.
Though an increase in benefits followed from changing evaluations of the
family's importance, there has been a scarcity of policy development and research
within the military on the actual needs of military families. Janowitz and Little
have identified some of the major areas of stress as residential mobility, changes
in women's roles, loosened ties with conjugal families and communities, a decrease
in family allegiance to the military, and retirement transition.55 Little comments
that "the esoteric occupational culture" of the military, and its forced family
ties with the father's occupation and associated organizational activities, is a
distinctive feature of the military family which has had positive, but in net
effect negative effects. 56
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The family separations which are related to military mobility patterns are to
some extent unique, and personnel must sometimes make a choice between rank and
family. A sizeable percentage of married personnel do not live with their families,
and for a majority of military families this means separation from relatively young
children and reduced participation in their early socialization. Spouses attached
to tactical or combat-ready units have difficulty establishing regular family inter-
action patterns. This tends to impose a double-parent role on the remaining parent
and has often led the family to redefine itself in the matriarchal direction.
Stanton points out that there are also outcomes in loss of ties with the more
supportive elements in the military community, excessive dependence on relatives,
infidelity, and efforts to seek help outside military social services. "The mili-
tary," he says, "shares the dubious honor with a few other occupational groups and
institutions of being a pioneer in the trend toward parental absence that has
emerged in U.S. society.
' 5 7
Frequent and often unexpected family relocations are conditions of life rather
than chance occurrences in the military, and are the source of potential family
problems. There is evidence that family members often try to reduce the painfulness
of relocation by avoiding deeply-felt extended kinship attachments, or by engaging
in non-intense short-lived personal relationships. Residential instability also
interrupts long-term medical care and children's schooling. From a mental health
standpoint, evidence has suggested that those wives most alienated from the military
find mobility most stressful. Though some studies suggest that family relocation
has had little significant adverse effect on the mental health of younger children,
emotional deprivation has indeed been an outcome in individual cases. In particular,
the effect on adolescents is problematical. Mobility separates them from important
peer supports for their own identity, and increases their dependence on parents at
a time when independence is a cultural requirement of the maturation process. For-
eign assignments, though often economically desirable, usually carry with them in-
evitable cultural shock for all family members, yet little counseling or prior
orientation to the new environment--or services around the anticipation of family
problems likely to occur in another society--are provided.
The dramatic change in job and environment discussed earlier for career
military facing retirement, has important family implications. Given the compara-
tive youthfulness of military families, retirement tends to occur for many career
personnel at just that family cycle point which involves large adolescent adjust-
ments.58  In addition, at a time when most civilians are reaching the height of
their earning period and productivity, 50,000 military retirees per year are enter-
ing the mainstream of the civilian occupational structure. The difficulties ex-
perienced by the inevitable transfer of the husband's anxieties and pressures onto
the family, and the strains the family feels directly in accommodating military and
civilian values, have affected change in military policies toward the family.
These policies have been translated into specific services. The recognition
of family relocation problems led to the Army Community Service, a comprehensive
program "to develop an organized system for bringing together all available military
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and civilian resources for the relief of personal and family problems.' 59 Wiest
and Devis have described it as "a spectrum of humanitarian and mental health ap-
proaches which are designed to meet the human needs of a highly technical, highly
mobile, multimission military population in cultural transition crises." 60 The
Air Force instituted the Family Service and Dependent Assistance Program to aid
families in resettling while husbands were on active duty. Another Air Force
program, titled Children Have a Potential, responds to handicapped children and
their parents.
The Civilian Health and Medical Program of the Uniformed Services, publicized
as a national health insurance plan for the military, involves a significant array
of family services, as well as medical care and individual counseling. The recent
extension of this program subsidizes outpatient psychiatric treatment and social
work services for military personnel and their families in civilian mental health
agencies and facilities. It is a unique case in which military territoriality and
control have been sacrificed in order to secure another goal, that of preserving
the family as a supportive milieu.
But CHAMPUS is a cogent example of some of the deficiencies in military-
sponsored social services to families. It was developed in the context of a
continuing shortage of military psychiatric and mental health professionals. It
has been criticized by Congress beginning in 1970 for program mismanagement, only
a few of the thirty-one recommendations made by Congress having been implemented
in the five years of its operation.6 Military families have felt little prece-
dence for trust in the confidentiality of records, and those at the higher ranks
have still avoided practitioners in any way related to the military. Personnel on
isolated posts and families on foreign assignment have not had access to the ser-
vices. The values within which military families have typically been socialized,
and their formal loyalty to a specialized occupational route to success, have
mediated against moving out to nonmilitary professionals who likely share a
public hostility to military service. Yet in seeking help within the military,
they have been hampered by the primary expectations of professionals for
preserving the family as an integrated group.
One of the major difficulties is that many of the family problems, to which
this part of the expansion of the military welfare state has reacted, are actually
generated by the nature of the organizational objectives of the military. These
strongly affect the environment in which families must function. The development
of services has therefore been both a military requirement and a protective re-
sponse to the changing norms for family life over which the military has little
control. In many cases, the net effect has been insufficient to compensate for
the superimposing on family life of a structure geared to warfare.
The Military Environment and Social Welfare Professionals.
Within the framework of the narrow view of personal adjustment in the mili-
tary, it is important to identify the roles played by military psychiatrists and
-511-
social workers. The Army has over 80% of all active duty social workers within its
ranks. Wiest and Devis claim that Army social work has constituted nearly all of
military social work services since World War 11.62 However, in 1969 this involved
only approximately 300 professionally trained social workers on active Army duty.63
Though military psychiatry developed rapidly in World War II, a substantial
expansion did not follow. The traditional psychiatric model was not entirely com-
patible with the military environment. Some writers have felt that social work
actually flourished in the military setting, largely because of its emphasis or
the inter-relationship of the individual and the environment. Social workers
tended to expand the scope of services beyond the individual to the family and
community, and increased the diversity of professional roles. They became involved
in integrating social work services into a total medical care program.64 The sig-
nificant point is that social workers had skills which the military increasingly
needed. Nevertheless, an inescapable tension existed between the professional
training, ethics, and objectives of professionals, and the organizational require-
ments of the military.
Daniels, in a series of articles which examine the role of the psychiatrist
in a military setting, concludes that psychiatrists have tended to be"agents of
the military bureaucracy" and therefore unable to serve their clients in the same
fashion as their civilian counterparts. "When problems of conflicting interests
arise," says Daniels, "the psychiatrist may be placed in a quandry. What is best
for the patient may be the opposite of what is best for the system. Such problems
arise most dramatically in times of combat.'65 She claims also that the psychia-
trist is directed by military goals to maintain an individual's fighting capability.
His professional code directs him to support his client's efforts to become a
healthier, more self-actualized person. The professional's choice between these
conflicting pressures has crucial consequences for individuals.
On the one hand, the professional--psychiatrist or social worker--is a gate-
keeper who must prevent the individual's exit from combat in wartime--due to
neurosis, psychosis, character disorder, drug addiction, dissenting behavior,
alienation. In peacetime, the professional is to perform a social control func-
tion in reducing potential disruption which could interfere with the achievement
of military goals. As General Westmoreland so revealingly stated the helping
professional plays "a personnel management consultant type role.''6
On the other hand, the military psychiatrist, psychologist, and social worker
are to be advocates for the individual's own integrity and wholeness. The profes-
sional codes of these professions are committed to the health and continuing
growth of the individual, somewhat in isolation from the cultural demands placed
upon him. This role, however, is often sacrificed within the military environment.
Robert Lifton feels, for example, that during the Vietnam period military psychia-
trists, social workers, and chaplains--in their role as "ultimate authorities of
the mind and spirit"--rationalized and justified the ordqring of combat personnel
into a situation that was both unnecessary and immoral. 6 7 "Helping" the soldier
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remain in combat, and sometimes to participate in war crimes, psychiatrists some-
times served to erode the soldier's capacity for moral revulsion and guilt. There-
fore he says that chaplains and psychiatrists "formed an unholy alliance not only
with the military command but also with the more corruptible elements in the sol-
dier's psyche." Lifton feels this produces a "counterfeit universe in which per-
vasive, spiritually-reinforced inner corruption becomes the price of survival."
In such a universe in Vietnam, he insists, conscientious professionals become
equally entrapped in an organizational commitment to war, and were profoundly
compromised.68
Professionalism itself may be partly to blame. The image of professionalism
gradually shifted as the society changed, first from a personal commitment, to the
development of general principles, and finally to specialized kinds of knowledge
and skills. Lifton suggests that the latter contained risks: "hierarchical dis-
tancing, medical mystification, and psychological reductionism" that tended to
undermine ethical responsibility. This is perhaps vastly overstated, but what
Lifton fears is critical--that the process of professionalism has involved a move
in the direction of "technique devoid of advocacy," away from a process of "advo-
cacy based on faith." The advocacy he has in mind is moral choice in support of
humane principles of psychological health and growth, in which professionals are
engaged in considering the nature and consequences of their real objectives.
The main problem for the professional in the military--which is not so for
civilian professionals--is the strong pressure to mold individuals into an effec-
tive fighting force, both bureaucratically and tactically. The professional is
no more immune to the rewards and sanctions involved in pursuing these objectives
than other military personnel. There is perhaps an even stronger tendency on
their part to rationalize the objectives of the system, because to remain within
the military requires some prompt resolution of the conflict between individual
growth goals and military goals. Through such a process, the military welfare
state tends to become a servant of the military establishment.
Conclusion
In this article, we have analyzed a comparatively specialized issue--the
impressive system of institutionalized universal and comprehensive entitlements
which form what we have termed a welfare state within the military. We have
built our case on the premise that in all social systems--of whatever size or
complexity--action tends to become organized around critical requisites for the
system's continuity and survival.
In being selective in illustrating our main ideas, certain important aspects
of the existing military welfare state have not been covered. We have not dis-
cussed many of the continuous and emerging needs of military personnel which
have not been met by existing benefits and services. We have not anticipated
the welfare problems and possibilities in the all-volunteer force.
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Another limitation is implicit in our approach, which judges the military wel-
fare state against three criteria: the extent to which it is in practice what it
formally purports to be, the way in which it compares with the nature of civilian
social provision, and the degree to which it provides optimum life quality for its
members. The latter is admittedly perfectionistic, but a criterion to which all
welfare systems should ultimately be made accountable. In this judicial process,
however, we have focused on the abundant weaknesses in military welfare, rather
than on its strengths.
Our major thesis has been that the military welfare state tends to become
shaped in the service of the dominant survival goals of the military establishment:
the maintenance of an adequate level of deterrent capability and of internal order.
In this context, military social provision has provided both incentives to perform
necessary organizational tasks, and sanctions to control behavior in the interests
of adequate performance. This has involved serious contradictions and inequities
which interfered with individuals' real welfare.
The military establishment, like other bureaucratic structures in modern his-
tory, is characterized by what Coleman has termed relatively autonomous "corporate
actors." For such corporate actors, he says, "the wants and interests of persons
...constitute only constraints on a path of which the goal is corporate survival
and growth." This, he contends, biases the direction such organizations take.
Organizational decisions about the development and use of resources are "more
and more removed from the multiplicity of dampening and modifying interests of
which a real person is composed.. .and more and more the resultant of narrow




1. Welfare state is here defined as Wilensky has developed that concept, the
essence of which is "protected minimum standards of income, nutrition, health,
housing, and education, assured to every citizen as a political right." Evidenj
suggests, says Wilensky, that many welfare states are financed by somewhat re-
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tribution and on the whole are likely to be egalitarian in net effect." He clail
that the welfare state represents the convergence of urban-industrial societies
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to use them, but served a psychological function in the context of an unusual
war environment. See Ladinsky (1976, p. 450).
49. See the Congressional testimony of Joe Garcia (Garcia, 1973, pp. 522-523).
50. Taussig (1974).
51. See Connally's article in this volume.
52. Janowitz (1960).
53. This information on family patterns within the military is based on Goldman's
excellent article in The Social Psychology of Military Service (1976, pp. 119-
132).
54. Janowitz, op.cit.
55. Janowitz and Little (1965).
56. Little (1971).
57. Stanton (1976, p. 142). The discussion of family mobility and separation
contributed heavily to this section.
58. Little comments that for this reason "the socialization process of the child
in the military community is relatively incomplete." (1971)
59. Bevilacqua and Morgan (1971, pp. 851-855).
60. Wiest and Devis (1971, pp. 319-345).
61. The Advocate (March, 1976).
62. Wiest and Devis, op.cit.
63. The Air Force had only forty-two, and the Navy tended to depend heavily on
chaplains. See Bevilacqua and Morgan, op.cit.
64. See Bevilacqua and Morgan and Wiest and Devis, op. cit.
65. See Daniels (1972, p. 155).
66. Westmoreland, U.S. Army article.
67. Lifton (1976, pp. 45-64). This article provided many of the ideas articulated
in this section.
68. Lifton feels the psychiatric principles of immediacy, proximity, and expectancy,
which were to facilitate combat personnel's successful integration into the
group life of their units effectively undermined personal integrity in judging
one's own ethical behavior in the combat situation. (1976).
69. Coleman (1974, pp. 46-50).
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